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INTRODUCTION
Does the equitable right of an individual, whose property has been damaged by the
debtor’s pollution, to injunctive clean-up relief constitute a “claim” that may be discharged in the
debtor’s Chapter 11 bankruptcy? This was the issue of first impression which the Pennsylvania
Bankruptcy Court dealt with in Krafczek v. Exide Corp., No. 00-1965, 2007 WL 1199530, at *1
(E.D. Pa. Apr. 19, 2007). The Krafczek court answered the question in the affirmative, 2007 WL
1199530 at *3, setting new precedent in an already narrow area of Bankruptcy Law upon which
other courts had trodden carefully.
This article has four parts. The first part provides a brief overview of the Bankruptcy
Code’s definition of the term “claim.” The second part examines the leading cases dealing with
injunctive environmental clean-up orders, with particular focus on how these cases helped carve
out an exception to the Code’s “claim” definition for certain injunctive clean-up orders. The
third part discusses Krafczek (citations omitted), its decision to restrict individuals from being
able to access the injunctive clean-up order remedy, as well as the court’s rationale behind that
decision. The article concludes with a few brief thoughts on how Krafczek could have been
similarly decided without reaching as far as it did, as well as on the burden that its holding places
on individuals.
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I.

THE DEFINITION OF “CLAIM” UNDER 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)
With a few narrow exceptions, none of which bears upon injunctive environmental clean-

up orders, a discharge in Bankruptcy Law discharges the debtor from all debts that arose before
bankruptcy. 11 U.S.C. § 727(b) (2006). Specifically, Section 727(b) states that “a discharge . . .
discharges the debtor from all debts that arose before the date of the order for relief under this
chapter, and any liability on a claim . . . if such claim had arisen before the commencement of
the case”. Id. For purposes of bankruptcy law, the term “debt” is defined as “liability on a
claim”. 11 U.S.C. § 101(12) (2006). Therefore, the definition of the term “claim” is central to
our discussion.
The Bankruptcy Code defines the term “claim” as:
A) “[A] right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to
judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured,
unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or
unsecured; or”
B) “[A] right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance if
such breach gives rise to a right to payment … .”
11 U.S.C. § 101(5) (2006).

Courts have interpreted the above definition as reflective of

Congress’s intent to make the coverage of the term “claim” as broad as possible, so as to include,
and thus discharge upon bankruptcy, a large variety of debtor obligations. See Pa. Dep’t of
Public Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552, 558 (1990) (rev’d on other grounds).
The first part of the definition, part (A), is the most straightforward. Essentially, any
right to payment that a party has against the debtor (pre-bankruptcy) will be considered a claim
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against the debtor. The modifying words that follow simply help expand the diverse forms that
such a right to payment might appear in. Id.
The second part of the definition, however, is more complex, and it is also the most
relevant for the purposes of this discussion.

Section 101(5)(B)’s phrase “right to an equitable

remedy . . . [giving] rise to a right to payment,” was concisely explained by the Seventh Circuit
in In re Udell. 18 F.3d 403 (7th Cir. 1995). In that case, an employer was seeking to enforce a
covenant not to compete against a former employee who had in the meantime filed for
bankruptcy. The employer argued that its right to an injunction against the employee was not a
“claim” and therefore was not discharged. Id. at 405. In holding that the injunctive relief sought
was indeed not a claim, and thus not dischargeable, Id. at 410, the Seventh Circuit explained that
Section 101(5)(B) could be interpreted as referring to “a right to an equitable remedy that can be
satisfied by an ‘alternative’ right to payment.” Id. at 407. The court went on to note that, “[i]f
the right to payment is not an alternative remedy, it must at least arise ‘with respect to’ the
equitable remedy, not apart from it.” Id. Thus, under the Udell court’s interpretation, the key
issue becomes “whether [plaintiff’s] right to an injunction ‘gives rise’ to an alternative or other
corollary right to payment of liquidated damages.” Id. In Udell, the court held that the answer
was no. Id. at 410. However, as the cases in the next section demonstrate, the Udell formulation
became a central tenet in the area of state-issued injunctive environmental clean-up orders.

II.

NON-CLAIM STATUS OF INJUNCTIVE ENVIRONMENTAL CLEAN-UP ORDERS
The first Supreme Court case that considered state-issued injunctive environmental clean-

up orders was Ohio v. Kovacs.

469 U.S. 274 (1985).

That case, however, left a lot of

unanswered questions which the Court meticulously listed as issues which it was not deciding.
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Later cases, such as In re Chateaugay, 944 F.2d 997 (2d Cir. 1991), expanded upon Kovacs, and
actually helped establish the non-claim status of such orders issued by states, provided that
certain circumstances were present. Then came In re Torwico Electronics, Inc., 8 F.3d 146 (3rd
Cir. 1993), which drawing upon the previous cases, firmly solidified the non-claim status of
state-issued injunctive clean-up orders. Finally, with the above case law already in place, came
Krafczek (citations omitted), which set new precedent on the applicability of this doctrine to
individuals, by essentially excluding them from being able to utilize such injunctive clean-up
orders after a polluter has filed for bankruptcy protection. The purpose of this section is to
examine these important decisions with a view towards outlining how injunctive clean-up orders
gained their present non-claim status.
The issue of whether obligations to remove toxic waste were dischargeable upon
bankruptcy, as well as the foundational considerations surrounding this issue, had their genesis in
the landmark Supreme Court case of Ohio v. Kovacs. 469 U.S. 274. In Kovacs, the state of
Ohio procured an injunctive order against the plaintiff, the CEO of a corporation which utilized
an industrial waste disposal site, requiring him to clean up the pollution at the site. Id. at 276.
When Kovacs failed to comply with his obligations, the state obtained a court order appointing
a receiver to take possession of the property and perform the clean-up. Id. After the receiver
was appointed, but before he could complete the clean-up task, Kovacs filed for personal
bankruptcy. Id. The state sought to obtain some of Kovacs’ post-bankruptcy income for use in
completing the clean-up, and it argued that Kovacs’s obligation under the injunctive order to
clean up the site was not dischargeable in bankruptcy for it was not a “claim.” Id. at 276-77.
The Supreme Court disagreed with the state’s position. In holding that the state indeed
possessed a right to payment, and thus a claim dischargeable in bankruptcy, the court noted that
Cite as: Non-Claim Status of Environmental Clean-Up Injunctions Limited to States, 1 ST. JOHN'S
BANKR. RESEARCH LIBR. NO. 31, at 4 (2009),
http://www.stjohns.edu/academics/graduate/law/journals/abi/sjbrl_main/volume/v1/Peshtani.stj
(follow "View Full PDF").

Peshtani - 5

once the receiver took over, Kovacs had lost possession of the waste site and could no longer
control its clean-up. Id. at 283. Therefore, he had effectively been dispossessed. Additionally,
the court noted that all that the state was seeking from Kovacs was money to complete the cleanup. Id. In conclusion then, the injunctive clean-up order “had been converted into an obligation
to pay money, an obligation that was dischargeable in bankruptcy”. Id.
The Court in Kovacs refused to decide some very important issues, however, leaving
them open to future cases. Specifically, the court did not decide “what the legal consequences
would have been had Kovacs taken bankruptcy before a receiver had been appointed.” Id. at
284. Also, the Court did not hold that “an injunction against bringing further toxic wastes on the
premises or against any [continuing] pollution of the site or the State’s waters” is dischargeable.
Id. Finally, the court reiterated that no one may maintain an ongoing nuisance, pollute state
waters, or refuse to remedy the source of such conditions. Id.
A subsequent case from the Seventh Circuit helped answer some of the questions which
Kovacs left unanswered. In In re CMC Heartland Partners, 966 F.2d 1143 (7th Cir. 1992), the
debtor owned a harmful waste site and filed for bankruptcy. Id. at 1144. Subsequently, the
Environmental Protection Agency issued a clean-up order to the debtor, who was still in
possession of the hazardous site, requiring it to clean and recondition the property. Id. at 1145.
The debtor protested on the grounds that this was a claim which did not survive bankruptcy. In
holding that the injunctive clean-up order did indeed survive bankruptcy, Judge Easterbrook
explained that “a statutory obligation attached to current ownership of the land survives
bankruptcy.” Id. at 1147. However, and this is where the holding surpasses that of Kovacs, the
EPA was required to show that the contamination by the site of surrounding areas was
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“threatened or ongoing” so as to “avoid the conclusion that it is repackaging a forfeited claim for
damages.” Id.
An even clearer formulation of the requirements that a state-issued injunctive clean-up
order must satisfy, so as to be considered a non-dischargeable non-claim, was given by the
Second Circuit in In re Chateaugay. 944 F.2d 997 (2d Cir. 1991). In that case, LTV Corporation
owned and operated many hazardous waste sites. Id. at 999. The EPA obtained injunctive
orders requiring LTV, which in the meantime had filed for bankruptcy, to clean up one of the
waste sites. Id. LTV contended that the orders constituted a claim which was discharged upon
bankruptcy. Id. at 1001. The court, in holding that the injunctive clean-up orders were not
claims under § 101(5)(B), explained that while “EPA is entitled to seek payment if it elects to
incur cleanup costs itself,” it had “no authority to accept a payment from a responsible party as
an alternative to continued pollution”. Id. at 1008. The court went on to state that since there is
no option on the part of a state entity to accept payment in lieu of continued contamination, any
injunctive environmental clean-up order issued by that state entity, which “to any extent ends or
ameliorates continued pollution is not an order for breach of an obligation that gives rise to a
right of payment” and is thus not a claim pursuant to § 101(5)(B). Id. (emphasis added).
However, the Chateaugay court made an additional observation of major importance to
our discussion. It specifically pointed out that where pollution is not ongoing, and a “creditor
obtaining the order ha[s] the option . . . to do the cleanup work itself and sue for response costs,
thereby converting the injunction into a monetary obligation,” the order is a claim pursuant to
101(5)(B) and thus discharged upon bankruptcy. Id. Therefore, to summarize the court’s view,
where the injunctive order seeks to end or ameliorate ongoing pollution, it is not a claim, even if
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the state had the option of cleaning the site itself and only suing subsequently for the cost.1 But
where the pollution is not ongoing, and the state’s injunctive order is issued despite the state
having the option to do the cleanup itself and sue for the cost, the order is a dischargeable claim.
In 1993, the Third Circuit was faced with precisely the same dilemma as the other two
circuits above. In In re Torwico Electronics, Inc., 8 F.3d 146 (3d Cir. 1993), the debtor was an
electronics manufacturer whose manufacturing plant included an illegal seepage pit containing
hazardous waste – waste which was migrating into surrounding bodies of water. Id. at 147. The
manufacturing property, along with the area of the seepage pit, was leased by the debtor from its
actual owners, and when that lease expired the debtor moved its business elsewhere.
Subsequently, the debtor filed for bankruptcy. Id. The New Jersey Dep’t. of Environmental
Protection and Energy, upon an inspection of the site, discovered the leaking pit and issued a
notice requiring the debtor to clean it up. When the debtor failed to comply, the state issued an
order levying a $22,500 penalty for non-compliance, in addition to requiring the submission of a
closure plan by the debtor. Id. at 147-48. Debtor immediately contested the order as constituting
a claim which was barred, since the state failed to file it within the claim-filing deadline. The
state, on the other hand, claimed that this was simply an injunctive order issued pursuant to state
law, and that it survived bankruptcy. Id. at 148.
The Third Circuit agreed with the state’s position. Holding that the state’s injunctive
clean-up order was not a claim, and thus survived bankruptcy, id. at 151, the court stated that
“[t]he state can exercise its regulatory powers and force compliance with its laws, even if the
debtor must expend money to comply”. Id. at 150 (emphasis added). It went on to note that
under Kovacs, “what the state cannot do is force the debtor to pay money to the state,” a request
1

Unless, of course, it actually did so, in which case Kovacs says that the clean-up order is
converted into an obligation to pay money and is thus a claim.
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which would turn the state from a regulator to a creditor. Id. However, this did not mean that the
state could not assert a non-compliance penalty against the debtor, which is simply an
enforcement of its laws. “Were we to adopt the . . . position that any order requiring the debtor
to expend money creates a dischargeable claim”, the court noted, “it is unlikely that a state could
effectively enforce its laws”. Id. at 150, n. 4.
There were two additional elements which the Torwico court examined in reaching its
conclusion. First, it found that the pollution involved was ongoing, thus precluding any claims
that the state was simply trying to repackage a forfeited claim for damages.

Id. at 150.

Additionally, the court disregarded the debtor’s argument that since its lease had expired on the
old property, just like the debtor in Kovacs, it was now not in possession of the property. The
court stated that unlike the debtor in Kovacs, the debtor here had access to the site, and the state
had not performed any clean-up of its own. Id. at 151. Ultimately, the court noted, while perhaps
the debtor’s clean-up obligations in the present case did not run with ownership of the land, they
did run with ownership of the waste which it threw upon the land. Id.

Therefore, the state’s

order survived bankruptcy.

III.

KRAFCZEK LIMITS THE NON-CLAIM STATUS OF INJUNCTIVE CLEAN-UP ORDERS TO
STATES.
The scenario presented in Krafczek v. Exide Corp., No. 00-1965, 2007 WL 1199530, at

*1 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 19, 2007), was dissimilar to any of the scenarios presented in the above cases
dealing with injunctive clean-up orders.

In Krafczek, the plaintiffs were a couple whose

residence was located near the defendant’s battery recycling plant. Id. They sued Exide,
alleging that contaminants from its factory were polluting the surrounding areas, including
causing substantial pollution of their property. Id. They requested equitable relief to compel
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Exide to decontaminate their property. A few months later, in a related case, the EPA obtained a
Consent Decree requiring Exide to clean up all of the surrounding areas, including plaintiff’s
property, but Exide failed in that effort and only partially cleaned up the plaintiff’s property.
Subsequently, Exide filed for bankruptcy, and its confirmed plan included an injunction and
discharge of all claims against it. Id. The Krafczeks filed a timely proof of claim, requesting
monetary relief for damages already caused, but not for the cost of remediation, since
remediation of the property was supposed to be carried out by Exide pursuant to the Consent
Decree. Plaintiffs asserted that under Torwico, their right to injunctive clean-up relief survived
bankruptcy because it did not constitute a claim. Krafczek, 2007 WL 1199530, at *2. The
debtor, on the other hand, contended that the plaintiffs’ right constituted a claim under §
101(5)(B), and was thus discharged. Id.
The court’s holding came as a surprise to the parties involved, for neither side appeared
to have anticipated the grounds upon which the court’s decision rested. Without citing any
precedent to this effect, the Krafczek court read Torwico, and by implication all the cases
preceding it, as allowing for injunctive clean-up orders to survive bankruptcy only when such
actions were brought against a debtor by states. Id. at *3. A state, the court noted, “can exercise
its regulatory powers and force compliance with its laws; but individual plaintiffs may not”. Id.
Therefore, the court concluded, the Krafczeks’ request for an injunctive order compelling Exide
to decontaminate their property was a dischargeable claim under § 101(5)(B). Id.
dismissal of their complaint was warranted. Id.

Cite as: Non-Claim Status of Environmental Clean-Up Injunctions Limited to States, 1 ST. JOHN'S
BANKR. RESEARCH LIBR. NO. 31, at 9 (2009),
http://www.stjohns.edu/academics/graduate/law/journals/abi/sjbrl_main/volume/v1/Peshtani.stj
(follow "View Full PDF").

Thus,

Peshtani - 10

IV.

CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
By limiting the availability of non-claim injunctive clean-up orders to states, the

Krafczek court’s holding places a severe limitation on the ability of individual plaintiffs to force
polluters to decontaminate the plaintiff’s properties, if those polluters subsequently file for
bankruptcy. This result, appears to be contrary to the Supreme Court’s warning in Kovacs, that
no “person or firm may . . . maintain a nuisance, pollute the waters of the State, or refuse to
remove the source of such conditions”. 469 U.S. at 285. Clearly, Exide was maintaining a
nuisance by its failure to decontaminate the plaintiffs’ property.
However, even if we assume that the request of the Krafzceks for injunctive relief was a
dischargeable claim, the court could have probably reached that result without severely limiting
the options of individual plaintiffs in general. For example, the court could have interpreted the
pollution on the Krafczek property as not being “ongoing” in the same way that a leaking
seepage pit is. It would have been a stretch, but it would not have had the adverse effect that the
court’s current holding has. Alternatively, the court could have considered whether Krafczeks’
request for injunctive relief was really a repackaged claim for damages. Whether this latter
analysis would have reached the same result as that actually reached by the court is questionable,
but it would have been a more cautious approach to take than simply refusing to make that
consideration by holding that Torwico was inapplicable to individuals. See Krafczek, 2007 WL
1199530, at *3 n. 4. It remains to be seen whether Krafczek will be affirmed on appeal to the
Third Circuit, the very court that decided Torwico. (citations omitted).
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